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Abstract: - Intrusions detection systems (IDSs) are 
systems that try to detect attacks as they occur or 
after the attacks took place. Honeypots are decoy 
computer  resources  set  up  for  the  purpose  of 
monitoring and logging the activities of entities that 
probe,  attack  or  compromise  them.  This  paper 
describes  a  hybrid  honeypot  which  is  the 
combination of high and low intraction honeypot, 
technique of applying Genetic Algorithm (GA) to 
it.  A  brief  overview  of  the  Intrusion  Detection 
System,  genetic  algorithm  and  related  detection 
techniques  is  presented.  This  is  helpful  for 
identification  of  complex  anomalous  behaviors 
proceedings. 
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           I. INTRODUCTION: 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a device 
or  software  application  that  monitors  network 
and/or system activities  for  malicious activities 
or  policy  violations  and  produces  reports  to  a 
Management Station. Some systems may attempt 
to  stop  an  intrusion  attempt  but this  is  neither 
required nor expected of a monitoring system. 
 
 
Fig1:  “Understanding  Intrusion  Detection  Systems”  by 
SANS inst. Reading room(2001) 
 
 
Figure depicts such a system where solid arrows 
indicate  data/control  flow  while  dotted  arrows 
indicate  a  response  to  intrusive  activity. 
According to Axelsson, the generic architectural 
model of an intrusion detection system contains 
the following modules: 
Audit data collection:  This  module  is used  in 
the data collection phase. Data collected in this 
phase  is  analyzed  by  the  intrusion  detection 
algorithm to find traces of suspicious activity. 
Audit data storage: Typical ids store the audit 
data either indefinitely or for a sufficiently long 
time for later reference. The volume of data is 
often exceedingly large. Hence, the problem of 
audit data reduction is a major research issue in 
the design of intrusion detection systems. 
Analysis and detection: The processing block is 
the heart of ids. It is here that the algorithms to 
detect  suspicious  activities  are  implemented. 
Algorithms  for  the  analysis  and  detection  of 
intrusions have been traditionally classified into 
three  broad  categories:  signature  (or 
misuse)detection, anomaly detection and hybrid 
(or compound) detection. 
Configuration data: The configuration data  is 
the  most  sensitive  part  of  an  ids.  It  contains 
information that is pertinent to the operation of 
the  intrusion  detection  system  itself  such  as 
information  on  how  and  when  to  collect  audit 
data, how to respond to intrusions, etc. 
Reference  data:  The  reference  data  storage 
module  stores  information  about  known 
intrusion signatures (in  signature detection) or 
profiles  of  normal  behavior  (in  the  anomaly 
detection).  In  the  latter  case,  the  profiles  are 
updated  when  new  knowledge  about  system 
behavior is available. 
Active/processing data: The processing element 
must frequently store intermediate results such as 
information  about  partially  fulfilled  intrusion 
signatures. 
Alarm:  This  is  the  output  may  be  either  an 
automated  response  to  an  intrusion  or  a 
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Passive and Reactive system 
In  a passive  system,  the  intrusion  detection 
system (IDS) sensor detects a potential security 
breach, logs the information and signals an alert 
on  the  console  and  or  owner.  In  a reactive 
system,  also  known  as  an intrusion  prevention 
system (IPS),  the  IPS  auto-responds  to  the 
suspicious activity by resetting the connection or 
by reprogramming the firewall to block network 
traffic from the suspected malicious source. The 
term IDPS is  commonly  used  where  this  can 
happen automatically or at the command of an 
operator; systems that both "detect" (alert) and/or 
"prevent." 
 
              II. HONEYPOT 
It is  a trap set  to  detect,  deflect,  or  in  some 
manner counteract attempts at unauthorized use 
of information systems. Generally it consists of 
a computer, data, or a network site that appears 
to be part of a network, but is actually isolated 
and  monitored,  and  which  seems  to  contain 
information or a resource of value to attackers. 
Honeypots are decoy computer resources set up 
for  the  purpose  of  monitoring  and  logging  the 
activities  of  entities  that  probe,  attack  or 
compromise them.  Activities on  honeypots can 
be considered suspicious by definition, as there 
is no point for benign users to interact with these 
systems.  Honeypots  come  in  many  shapes  and 
sizes;  examples  include  dummy  items  in  a 
database,  low-interaction  network  components 
like  preconfigured  traffic  sinks,  or  full-
interaction hosts with real operating systems and 
services 
 
Type of Honeypots 
 
A. Production / Research  
Production  honeypots  are  usually  used  by 
commercial organizations to help mitigate risks. 
This kind of honeypots adds value to the security 
measures of an organization. 
Research  honeypots  are  designed  to  gather 
information  about  the  attackers.  They  do  not 
provide  any  direct  value  to  a  specific 
organization but are used to collect information 
about what threats organizations may face. 
B. Low / High Interactivity  
Interaction  defines  the  level  of  activity  a 
honeypot allows an attacker.  
Low-interactivity  honeypots  do  not  implement 
actual  functional  services,  but  provide  an 
emulated environment that can masquerade as a 
real OS running services to connecting clients. 
These  limited  functionalities  are  often  scripts 
that  emulate  simple  services  making  the 
assumption of some predefined behavior of the 
attacker. His possibilities to interact with these 
emulated  services  are  limited,  which  make  the 
low-interactivity  honeypots  less  risky  than  the 
high-interactivity  honeypot. Indeed, there  is  no 
real OS or service for the attacker to log on to 
and  therefore  the  honeypot  cannot  be  used  to 
attack or harm other systems. The primary value 
of  low-interactivity  honeypots  is  detection  of 
scans  or  unauthorized  connection  attempts  but 
tend to be not good for finding unknown attacks 
and  unexpected  behaviour.  Low-interactivity 
honeypots  are  often  used  as  production 
honeypots. 
Advantages:  
–  Easy to deploy,  
–  minimal risk 
Disadvantages:  
–  Emulated services provide 
limited interaction which 
makes it difficult to determine 
the real motives of the insider. 
–  Internal low-interaction 
honeypots are probably only 
useful for detecting worms or 
sweeping vulnerability scans. 
Examples:Black hole routers advertising dark IP 
space,Arbor  Networks  Whitepaper  on  Sink 
holes,Specter, KFSensor, Honeyd, and Labrea. 
 
High-interactivity  honeypots,  do  not  emulate 
anything and gives the attacker a real system to 
interact with where almost nothing is restricted 
which  makes  them  more  risky  than  the  low-
interactivity  honeypots.  These  types  of 
honeypots should be placed behind a firewall to 
limit the risks. They tend to be difficult to deploy 
and maintain but it is believed that they provide 
a  vast  amount  of  information  about  attackers 
allowing the research community to learn more 
about  the  blackhat  community  behaviour  and 
motives.  They  are  usually  used  as  research 
honeypots. 
Advantages:  
–  Provide real operating systems 
and services, no emulation. 
–  Insider  may  interact  with  real 
services  for  a  long  time 
capturing  extensive 
information. 
–  Any  interaction  should  be 
considered malicious. Does not 
Divya et al,Int.J.Computer Techology & Applications,Vol 3 (1),187-191
IJCTA | JAN-FEB 2012 
Available online@www.ijcta.com
188
ISSN:2229-6093have  to  match  an  attack 
signature from an ID. 
Disadvantages: 
–  Complex  to  deploy  (easier 
with  Honeywall  CD),  greater 
risk. 
–  Captures insiders less familiar 
with your environment. 
Examples  include  Symantec  Decoy  and 
Honeynets 
 
C. Physical V.S. Virtual Honeypots 
 
A  physical  honeynet  is  one  in  which  the 
honeypots  are  running  in  separate  physical 
machines other than being run a several virtual 
hosts  in  a  single  physical  machine.  The  data 
control and data capture are also implemented in 
separate physical equipment than to be combined 
with the honeypots in one machine. 
 1-Real machines 2-Own IP Addresses   3-Often 
high-interactive 
Virtual  honeynet  is  a  technology  that  virtually 
implements many different operating systems in 
one  hardware  computer,  and  hence  instead  of 
having  a  honeynet  of  different  physically 
separate  honeypots,  all  the  honeypots  will  be 
virtually housed in one machine and still appear 
to  the  attacker  like  its  different  separate 
machines 
-Simulated by other machines that: 
1-Respond to the traffic sent to the honeypots 2-
May  simulate  a  lot  of  (different)  virtual 
honeypots at the same time. 
 
Value of honeypots  
The value of honeypots depends closely on what 
kind  of  honeypot  we  are  dealing  with. 
Production  honeypots  are  used  to  help 
organizations  protecting  themselves  against 
attackers,  which  include  preventing,  detecting 
and  responding  to  attacks.  Research  honeypots 
are  used  to  collect  information  that  will  be 
analysed to develop better protection methods.  
 
1. Prevention  
Prevention means keeping the threat out of the 
productions systems. This can be done by several 
means  such  as  firewalls,  authentication  and 
encryption.  However,  honeypots  add  a  little 
value  to  prevention.  While  honeypots  can 
prevent  the  spreading  of  a  worm  across  the 
network  (sticky  honeypots),  they  also  prevent 
from  human  attackers.  Two  concepts  are 
involved  in  human  prevention:  deception  and 
deterrence.  Deception  is  making  the  attacker 
waste  his  time  and  resources  attacking 
honeypots. The deterrence is when the attacker 
doesn’t want to attack some network because he 
knows  that  there  are  honeypots  in  that  n/w 
fearing to be logged n caught.  
2. Detection  
Detection is to identify a failure or a breakdown 
in  the  prevention.  This  can  be  also  done  by 
several  means  such  as  IDS  but  honeypots 
address  effectively  some  weaknesses  of  such 
prevention  systems:  false  positives,  false 
negatives  and  value  of  data  gathered.  Because 
honeypots  have  no  productions  purposes,  they 
generate very few false positives. Because all the 
traffic to and from the honeypots is suspicious, 
they  also  address  the  false  negative  issue. 
Because  of  their  simplicity  and  design, 
honeypots gather little amount of data with very 
high value.  
3. Response  
The challenge that organizations face when they 
want to react to an attack is evidence collection. 
This is an important issue when the organization 
wants to prosecute the attacker as well as when 
they  want  to  defend  themselves  against  this 
threat.  Honeypots  address  these  problems  in  2 
ways. First, the only traffic on the honeypot is 
the  attacker  traffic  and  it  makes  it  easier  to 
analyse the attacker behaviors in honeypots than 
in  production  systems  since  the  only  data 
retrieved  from  the  honeypot  is  malicious  data. 
Second,  it  is  much  simpler  to  pull  offline  the 
honeypot  for  further  analysis  without  affecting 
other business activities of the organizations 
 
Advantages of Honeypots  
 
  Fidelity – Small data sets of high 
value  
  New tools and tactics  
  Not resource intensive  
  Simplicity 
 
Disadvantages of Honeypots  
•  Skill intensive 
•  Limited view  
•  Does not directly protect vulnerable 
systems  
•  Risks 
 
Building your HoneyPots:  
•  Specifying Goals 
•  Selecting the implementation 
strategies      
•  Implementing Data Capture 
•  Logging and managing data 
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 III.  HYBRID MODEL 
 
Hybrid honeypot is the combination of low and 
high  interaction  honeypots.  Hybrid  architecture 
that combines the best features of honeypots. It 
helps  in  detecting  intrusion  attacking  on  the 
system.  For  this,  I  have  proposed  the  hybrid 
model  of  hybrid  honeypot.  Low  interaction 
honeypot provide enough interaction to attackers 
to allow honeypot to detect interesting attacks. It 
gives  information  about  attacks  and  attack 
patterns. This honeypot framework to propose a 
hybrid  approach  that  improves  the  current 
security. 
 
L I 
HONEYPOT
H I 
HONEYPOT
KNOWN 
ATTACK
UNKNOWN 
ATTACK
Processing Data  Log Signature Genetic 
Algorithm
Alarm
Data gathering
 
Fig 2: Hybrid model of IDS using honeypot with GA. 
 
Data Gathering: Data is collected over here for 
detection of  intrusion  from the  various  sources 
by inside and outside of the network. 
 
High Interaction/Low interaction Honeypot:-
In this data is divided on the basis on known and 
unknown attack. Known attacks are send to high 
interaction  honeypot  and  unknown  attacks  are 
send to low interaction honeypot. 
 
Signature based approach: It works just similar 
to  the  existing  anti-virus  software.  In  this 
approach  the  semantic  characteristics  of  an 
attack  is  analyzed  and  details  is  used  to  form 
attack  signatures.  The  attack  signatures  are 
formed in such a way that they can be searched 
using information in audit data logs produced by 
computer  systems.  There  are  various  signature 
matching  algorithms  used  in  various  signature 
based cyber attack detection systems. 
 
Genetic Algorithm: A Genetic Algorithm (GA) 
is  a  family  of  computational  models  based  on 
principles of evolution and natural selection. A 
GA employs a set of adaptive 
processes that mimic the concept of “survival of 
the  fittest”.  A  honeypot,  using  a  network  tap, 
span port, hub, or firewall, collects traffic based 
information that traverse a given network. This 
traffic  data  is  then  used  by  the  GA  for  the 
creation a set of rules for an Intrusion Prevention 
Rule based system. Intrusion prevention follows 
the  same  process  of  gathering  and  identifying 
data and behavior, with the added ability to block 
or prevent the activity. 
 
 
Fig.3: Structure of a simple genetic algorithm (Pohlheim, 
2001) 
 
Fig. starts with a randomly generated population, 
evolves  through  selection,  crossover,  and 
mutation. Finally,  the  best  individual  is picked 
out  as  the  final  result  once  the  optimization 
criterion is met (Pohlheim, 2001). 
 
Selection:  In  essence,  the  GA  begins  to 
“experiment”  with  the  existing  set  of 
chromosomes  by  combining  and  refining  the 
genes  contained  within  each  chromosome.  The 
objective  is  to  produce  new  chromosomes  that 
form a  new generation of possible solutions to 
evaluate. 
Crossover:  The  crossover  operation  allows  the 
GA  to  create  new  chromosomes  that  share 
positive  characteristics  while  simultaneously 
reducing  the  prevalence  of  negative 
characteristics  in  an  otherwise  reasonably  fit 
solution. 
Mutation:  The  final  step  in  the  refinement 
process  is  mutation.  The  mutation  phase 
randomly changes the value of a gene from its 
current setting to a completely different one. 
 
Processing  Data:  Data  is  processed  over  here 
and then the output is send to log for storage. 
 
Log:  It  consists  of  databases.  It  contains  the 
entries  in  a  list.  Each  log  entry  is  compared 
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signature  is  a  pattern  of  data  that  uniquely 
identifies a specific log entry. When a log entry 
matches  a  signature,  the  log  entry  is  typically 
processed further and then reported to the user or 
backend reporting system. 
 
TABLE I 
Attribute  Range  Description 
Source IP  0.0.0.0-
255.255.255.255 
Suspect IP 
address. 
Destination IP  0.0.0.0-
255.255.255.255 
Database 
server 
Port No.  0-65535  This is a http 
service for 
internal data 
access. 
Protocol  1-20  Eg. FTP 
 
 
Alarm: - If honeypot detects an intrusion then it 
raises the alarm. It beeps the alarm when it finds 
the intrusion in a system. 
 
              IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
A  hybrid  intrusion  detection  system  using 
honeypot is a part of the defensive operations. 
These are a highly flexible security tool that can 
be  used  in  a  variety  of  different  deployments. 
The  goal  of  honeypot  is  to  identify  entities 
attempting to subvert in-place security controls. 
These  are  tools  to  acquire  knowledge.  The 
education  they  provide  is  their  most  important 
contribution.  They  also  require  substantial 
resources to operate correctly. It can provide a 
fantastic  learning  tool  in  computer  security. 
These  are  a  cheap  and  simple  way  to  add 
protection to a network and help developing new 
ways for countering them. 
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